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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Quality-adjusted life year (QALY) values measured by means
of the time tradeoff (TTO) method are often used in economic evaluations.
However, these values are mostly not corrected for time preference, i.e., a
lower valuation being attached to later life years than to earlier life years,
and therefore may underestimate the true QALY weights. Moreover, the
magnitude of the underestimation depends on the severity of the health
state and the horizon chosen in the TTO method. Hence, we cannot just
add a constant component to all existing QALY tariffs. In this study, we
estimated the value of correcting TTO scores. We showed the possible
consequences for health policymaking when we correct TTO scores for
time preference, thereby taking into account severity and horizon.
Methods: We employed the results obtained using a nonparametric
time preference elicitation method. We made use of experimental
time preference data, in order to better represent individuals’ time
preferences.
Results: Our results demonstrate that correcting for time preference does
not result in one clear inﬂuence on the QALY gains from health changes.
When considering these changes in the context of cost–utility ratios, the
proportional change in the QALY gain is crucial.
Conclusions: Correcting TTO scores has a moderate, yet nonnegligible
inﬂuence on outcomes. We conclude that correcting TTO scores for time
preference is feasible and inﬂuential, so that there can be a substantial
value of correcting values for time preference.
Keywords: correction factor, economic evaluation, time preference, time
tradeoff method.
Introduction
Many economic evaluations in health care use quality-adjusted
life year (QALY) weights that have been elicited by the time
tradeoff (TTO) method to measure effects [1–3]. The TTO
method determines the utility (on a scale from 0, i.e., death, to 1,
i.e., full health) associated with being in some imperfect health
state by eliciting the indifference between two distinct health
streams: one living in a better condition yet for a shorter period
of time and the other living in a worse condition for a longer
period of time. Thus, the individual needs to tradeoff life years
against health improvements. A typical TTO exercise will ask a
respondent to assume living 10 more years in a particular health
state X, after which death follows. The alternative is to be
completely healthy again, but to live less than 10 years. The
individual’s task is then to indicate how many life years she
would be prepared to give up regaining full health. If the person,
for instance, indicates to consider 7 years in full health to be
equivalent to living 10 years in state X (and having set the utility
of full health equal to 1) the QALY weight of X is then normally
simply calculated as 7/10 = 0.7. A well-known problem with
directly applying these crude results obtained through a typical
TTO is that this procedure assumes that respondents attach
equal weight to all future life years, which is highly unlikely as
normally, people exhibit (strong) time preference, giving more
weight to current events and less to future ones [4,5]. Time,
preference obviously distorts the values obtained through a TTO
[6–10], yet this distortion is commonly left uncorrected, even in
national tariffs. This obviously raises the issue of the size of the
resulting bias and the effect this has on health state valuations
and economic evaluations.
In a simulation, Dolan and Jones-Lee [10] showed the poten-
tial consequences of time preference for health state utilities
derived by the TTO method. In particular, they pointed out that
the adjustment depends on the score of the health state, with
utilities around 0.5 requiring the greatest adjustment, whereas
very poor (close to 0) and very good (close to 1) health states
need least adjustment. These simulations, however, assumed the
constant discounting model, and did not empirically estimate
discount rates. Because it is questionable whether the constant
discounting model is descriptively valid [11–13] and because the
exact discount rates used in simulations were not derived from
empirical studies, the question of what exactly is the impact of
time preference on TTO scores remains unanswered. Moreover,
the implications of (not) correcting for time preference for the
practice of economic evaluations and health policy have largely
remained unaddressed.
This article aimed to ﬁll this gap by investigating the conse-
quences for policy recommendations of correcting for time pref-
erence, while using experimentally elicited time preference
estimates and not assuming any particular parametric time pref-
erence model. The correction factors (CFs) for several different
health states are calculated, as well as for several different gauge
durations which may be used as stimulus in TTO exercises. The
remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we explain
the QALY model and the TTO method in the Methods Section.
There, we also show how TTO scores can be corrected for time
preference. The results of our simulation exercises using the
empirically obtained time preference data are presented in the
Results Section, where we also highlight the practical conse-
quences of (not) correcting for time preference. Finally, the Con-
clusions Section discusses the results and provides the main
messages of our study.
Address correspondence to: Arthur E. Attema, iBMG/iMTA, Erasmus
University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail:
attema@bmg.eur.nl, brouwer@bmg.eur.nl
10.1111/j.1524-4733.2010.00773.x
Volume 13 • Number 8 • 2010
V A L U E I N H E A LT H
© 2010, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) 1098-3015/10/879 879–884 879
Methods
The QALY model is a common way to describe preferences over
health streams. Let h = (hj, . . . , hT) denote a health proﬁle where
ht denotes the health state in period t = j, . . . , T, where T is
the decision-maker’s ﬁnal period of life. A constant health
proﬁle h = (hj = a, . . . , hT = a) is indicated as health proﬁle a
with duration na. Further, v(ht) is a value function that repre-
sents the individual’s preferences over health quality and d(t)
denotes the corresponding weight attached to the value in
this period. It can then be shown that, under some
reasonable assumptions, h is weakly preferred to h′ if and
only if δ δt v h t v ht
t j
T
t
t j
T
( ) ∗ ( )( ) ≥ ( )∗ ( )( )
= =
∑ ∑ ′ [14]. We call
U t h t v ht t
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=
∑ δ the general QALY model and assume
that health proﬁles are evaluated by this function. We term the
function W T t
t
T
( ) = ( )
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1
the utility of life duration for the period
between t = 1 and t = T. A concave utility function for life dura-
tion is considered equivalent to (positive) time preference.
In the TTO method, the value of a health state b can be
elicited by asking the subject to give some period nFH in
full health (FH), followed by death (D), which makes her
indifferent to a stated period in health state b (nb), also followed
by death. That is, the indifference relation (h1 = FH, . . . ,
hnFH = FH,hnFH + 1 = D, . . . , hnb = D) ~ (h1 = b, . . . , hnb = b) is
obtained. Under the general QALY model, this indifference can
be represented by the following equation:
W n v W n v FH W n W n v DFH FHβ ββ( ) ∗ ( ) = ( ) ∗ ( ) + ( ) − ( )( ) ∗ ( ) (1)
If the value function over health is normalized so that v(FH) = 1
and v(D) = 0, this simpliﬁes to:
W n v W nFHβ β( ) ( ) = ( )* (2)
That is, the value of health state b is given by:
v
W n
W n
FHβ
β
( ) = ( )( ) (3)
Users of the TTO method, however, often assume linear
utility of life duration, so that W(T) = T or d(t) = 1 for each t. The
model then simpliﬁes to the linear QALY model, where equal
weight is attached to all health state values regardless of their
timing. We get the following simple expression for v(b), which we
denote a TTO score:
v
n
n
FHβ
β
( ) = (4)
In case of time preference, W(t) is increasing at a decreasing
rate with t, causing v(b) to be higher in Equation 3 than in
Equation 4. In order to get an estimate that incorporates the
individual’s time preference, there are essentially two possibilities.
First, we can elicit the function W(t) for each respondent within
the TTO exercise itself and use this to compute Equation 3 with
the values of the TTO method (i.e., nb and nFH). Attema and
Brouwer [5] discuss in detail how this can be done using a risk-free
elicitation method. However, once the time preference of a rel-
evant population has been determined (e.g., in a previous study),
an alternative may be to use a set of CFs which are representative
for the considered population. These CFs can subsequently be
used to correct the rawTTO scores (Equation 4) upwards. That is,
having some estimate of W(nFH) and W(nb) in Equation 3, we can
compute a (health state-speciﬁc) CF, CF = W(nFH)/W(nb) - nFH/nb
that links Equation 3 to Equation 4. This allows one to perform
an ordinary TTO exercise and infer the corrected TTO score by
computing v
n
n
CFFHβ
β
( ) = + . In this article, we ﬁrst brieﬂy show
how the function W(t) can reliably be elicited and then demon-
strate how such an elicitation can subsequently be applied to
compute CFs.
In order to estimate W(t), we use the direct method of Attema
et al. [15]. This method elicits the utility of life duration function
W(t) in a risk-free manner. The advantages of this method are
that it is not distorted by probability weighting, that it avoids the
inclusion of the problematic outcome immediate death, that it
does not make parametric assumptions, and that it appears to be
more feasible for respondents than alternative methods [15]. The
correction procedure by means of the obtained utility estimate is
straightforward and is explained by Attema and Brouwer [5]. We
brieﬂy describe the main steps here. Suppose a subject has
declared to be indifferent between 7 years in full health and
10 years in an impaired health state. As indicated in the intro-
duction, normally, a raw TTO score of 7/10 = 0.7 is then
inferred. When invoking the correcting procedure, we ﬁrst have
to compute the utilities of 7 and 10 years. To this end, we need an
elicitation of W(t) for a horizon encompassing at least the con-
sidered TTO horizon of 10 years. Suppose we take a horizon of
T = 50 years. Then, after, without loss of generality, setting
W(50) = 1 and W(0) = 0, we can measure the number of years t
such that W(t) = 0.5, 0.25, 0.75, 0.125, etc. (For instance,
W(t) = 0.5 implies eliciting that particular point t where the
weight attached to the years up to t equals the weight attached to
the years after t. So, if, in this case t = 10, this means that the
individual attaches as much weight to the ﬁrst 10 years as to
the remaining 40.) Now, if we, for example, have elicited
W(5) = 0.125 and W(12) = 0.25 in the subject, we are able to
estimate W(7) and W(10) by means of linear interpolation.
That is, W(7) = 0.125 + (7 - 5)/(12 - 5)*(0.25 - 0.125) = 0.161
and W(10) = 0.125 + (10 - 5)/(12 - 5)*(0.25 - 0.125) = 0.214,
so that the corrected TTO score is equal to W(7)/W(10) = 0.752,
leading to a CF = 0.752 - 0.7 = 0.052 for this health state. If this
CF is assumed to be applicable in another population, it can
subsequently be applied directly to the crude TTO scores.
Given the feasibility of correcting for time preference, espe-
cially in the context of calculating national tariffs, it seems that the
value of correcting values outweighs its cost. In smaller studies,
rather than repeatedly determining ownCFs, using predeﬁnedCFs
may be a feasible alternative. In any case, not correcting TTO
scores for time preference seems a less attractive option.
In what follows, we will make use of the data elicited in an
experiment by Attema and Brouwer [16]. The information about
the utility of life duration was used there to correct TTO scores
for a particular health state for time preference. This article uses
their median time preference estimates for the correction of
several health states. Table 1 shows these rates. The table shows
the median estimated values of t attached to the ﬁxed values of
W(t). The estimates of t are expressed relatively to the maximum
duration (T = 50). Note that a limitation of the study of Attema
and Brouwer [16] is that they only had data on a sample of
Table 1 Median elicited relative durations (t) for given utility of life
duration [W(t)]
W(t) = 0.125 W(t) = 0.25 W(t) = 0.5 W(t) = 0.75 W(t) = 0.875
t = 0.08 t = 0.17 t = 0.38 t = 0.61 t = 0.77
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university students. Therefore, the goal of this article was not to
provide a full set of representative CFs, but to demonstrate the
impact of correcting TTO scores for time preference. In order to
estimate CFs that can be broadly applied (e.g., to correct national
QALY tariffs), an elicitation of these factors among a represen-
tative sample of a nation is called for.
We simulate the inﬂuence of correcting for time preference on
QALY weights by considering nine different health states,
varying form very poor to very mild. These severities are cap-
tured by considering nine different uncorrected TTO scores: 0.1,
0.2, . . . , 0.9. In addition, we investigate three different gauge
durations used in the measurement process, i.e., 10, 20 and
40 years, to demonstrate the CFs for TTO exercises using a time
horizon exceeding 10 years.
Results
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the resulting CFs. They vary between
0.01 for the most severe and mildest health states when using the
10-year horizon, and 0.09 for the middle health state (i.e., with
a raw TTO score of 0.5) when using the 40-year horizon. Our
results deviate somewhat from those of Dolan and Jones-Lee [10]
in that our CFs for the smaller horizons, i.e., 10 or 20 years, tend
to be the highest around 0.4 instead of 0.5. This is caused by a
slope of the discount function that deviates from the exponential
function, which emphasizes the importance of using empirically
derived estimates for time preference.
These results indicate a general tendency of a correction for
time preference. First of all, the correction has no effect for TTO
scores of 0 and 1. For all other health states, the correction
increases the utility score for the health states, albeit at different
rates. In terms of health changes, which, in the context of eco-
nomic evaluation, are the outcomes of interest, the direction of
the inﬂuence of the correction for time preference is less clear.
Assume a change from inferior health state A to superior health
state B. Using uncorrected TTO scores, the change from A to B
would be calculated in QALYs as
n
n
n
n
FH
B
FH
A
− , whereas after cor-
rection, this becomes
n
n
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n
n
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B
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⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ − +⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ or
n
n
n
n
CF CFFH
B
FH
A
B A−
⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ + −( ). How the difference score, i.e., the
QALY gain, improves after correction therefore crucially
depends on the height of the CF for health state B relative to that
for health state A. It is clear that the CFs for death and full health
are, by deﬁnition, equal to zero. Therefore, correcting for time
preference has no implications for treatments that save people
from dying and restore full health. All other CFs for health states
in between death and full health are positive. This implies that if
health state A is death (and therefore CFA = 0) and health state B
is not full health, so that CFB > 0, the QALY gain increases with
CFB. As can be easily seen in Figure 1, the correction is most
favorable for treatments that rescue people from death to a
health state with a raw value of around 0.4 (obtained through a
Table 2 Median correction factors
Horizon
(years)
Raw TTO
score
Median corrected
TTO score
Difference
(CF)
Relative
difference (%)
10 0.1 0.109 0.009 9
0.2 0.219 0.019 9
0.3 0.328 0.028 9
0.4 0.438 0.038 9
0.5 0.535 0.035 7
0.6 0.632 0.032 5
0.7 0.729 0.029 4
0.8 0.826 0.026 3
0.9 0.917 0.017 2
20 0.1 0.120 0.020 20
0.2 0.240 0.040 20
0.3 0.346 0.046 15
0.4 0.453 0.053 13
0.5 0.548 0.048 10
0.6 0.639 0.039 6
0.7 0.730 0.030 4
0.8 0.821 0.021 3
0.9 0.913 0.013 1
40 0.1 0.140 0.040 40
0.2 0.265 0.065 32
0.3 0.374 0.074 25
0.4 0.481 0.081 20
0.5 0.585 0.085 17
0.6 0.683 0.083 14
0.7 0.780 0.080 11
0.8 0.868 0.068 8
0.9 0.938 0.038 4
TTO, time tradeoff; CF, correction factor.
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Figure 1 Correction factors for 10-, 20-, and
40-year time tradeoffs.
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10-year TTO). Inversely, if health state B is full health and health
state A is not ‘death’, the correction for time preference results in
a reduced QALY gain (i.e., with CFA > 0 and CFB = 0). Again, the
largest impact on the gain is when the uncorrected TTO score of
health state A is around 0.4 in a 10-year TTO.
Therefore, the fact that all QALY weights but the extremes
increase when correcting for time preference does not necessarily
imply that all health-care interventions become more cost-
effective because of corrections. In fact, this holds as a rule only
for lifesaving programs that do not return someone to full health
because a positive CF is added to the gain. Oppositely, the QALY
gain of treatments bringing someone from an impaired health
state with a positive QALY weight to full health will unequivo-
cally be reduced, because a positive CF is subtracted from the
gain.
For all other treatments, both the QALY weight of the start-
ing health state and the QALY weight of the end health state will
increase, so that a priori no prediction on the sign of the change
in effects can be made. That is, CFB – CFA may be either positive
or negative. Looking at Figure 1, taking the 10-year TTO as an
example, one can easily derive for which treatments the differ-
ence between CFB and CFA will be positive (i.e., when the point
on the correction curve for the initial health state is lower than
for the end state). For treatments of health states in the neigh-
borhood of the maximal CF (i.e., the top of the graphs in Fig. 1),
the graph is relatively ﬂat, so for treatments that bring a patient
from a state in that region to a better state close to the original
state (say, from 0.4 to 0.5), the correction does not make much of
a difference. Similarly, the graphs clearly show other treatments
that are not inﬂuenced by correction for time preference, for
example treatments improving the health state from 0.3 to 0.7
for a 10-year gauge duration, and from 0.2 to 0.6 for a 20-year
gauge duration.
It is important to realize that the implications of these CFs
also depend on the policy context. Because all CFs are positive,
correcting for time preference obviously results in higher valua-
tions of all health states except the extremes. While this is impor-
tant in its own right, the consequences hereof for policymaking
are perhaps even more informative. One ﬁrst consequence is that
the value of a typical life (i.e., the summation of QALYs over
lifetime) will certainly increase, justifying more resources to be
spent on health. Below, we highlight the importance of correcting
for time preference using three distinct yet general examples in
the context of economic evaluations: 1) demonstrating the
impact of correcting values on establishing the QALY gain of
some treatment; 2) demonstrating the impact of correcting when
different time horizons were used to obtain the QALY weights for
the relevant health states; and 3) demonstrating the monetary
value of the correction when a health gain is judged against a
ﬁxed threshold.
Example 1—Comparing Treatments before and after
Correcting for Time Preference
Normally, in an economic evaluation, a difference score between
two health states (e.g., before and after treatment or old vs. new
treatment) is calculated. When taking into account time prefer-
ence, ﬁrst, the differential impact for different health states is of
interest. Suppose, for example, that we can choose from three
available treatments, all costing the same, i.e., €1000. The effects
are measured by uncorrected 10-year horizon TTO scores.
According to these numbers, one treatment causes an improve-
ment in health from 0 to 0.1 [cost–utility ratio (CUR) = €10,000/
QALY], another from 0.4 to 0.5 (CUR = €10,000/QALY), and a
third from 0.9 to 1 (CUR = €10,000/QALY). That is, ignoring
equity and other concerns, all treatments at ﬁrst glance have the
same effects for the same costs. Therefore, they would receive
equal priority. If we now consider the corrected scores, we get a
different picture. The ﬁrst treatment increases health from 0 to
0.109, i.e., a positive CF of 0.009 is added to the end state,
resulting in a CUR of €9174/QALY. The second increases health
with 0.097 from 0.438 to 0.535, so that the CFs result in a net
reduction of the QALY gain with 0.003, leading to a corrected
CUR of €10,309/QALY. Finally, the third treatment increases
health from 0.917 to 1. That is, because of the CF of 0.017 for
the initial health state, the utility gain drops to 0.083, leading to
a corrected CUR of €12,048/QALY. The ﬁrst treatment has now
become the most cost-effective treatment, whereas the third treat-
ment has become the least cost-effective.
Example 2—CURs
Suppose that we have to invest in one of two treatments. Both
treatments save people’s lives and return them to some chronic
health state for 1 year, after which they die. One treatment causes
patients to get in a very poor state, the QALYweight of which has
been elicited by means of a 20-year TTO, resulting in a raw TTO
score of 0.1. The treatment costs €5000. The alternative treatment
returns the patient for 1 year to a medium health state that is
valued at 0.5 with the aid of a 10-year TTO. This treatment has a
cost of €25,000. Both treatments therefore have aCURof €50,000
per QALY when not correcting for time preference (note that the
choice of a speciﬁc time horizon in a TTOmatters. An uncorrected
TTO score of 0.5 obtained through a 10-year TTO implies a
different utility value than one obtained through a 20-year TTO).
If we abstract from issues such as budget constraints and equity
concerns, both treatments receive equal priority. If we correct for
time preference, however, this equivalence no longer holds. The
corrected QALY weight for the severe health state increases to
0.12, whereas the corrected QALY weight for the medium health
state is equal to 0.535. The CURs now decrease to €41,667 and
€46,729, respectively. Therefore, the treatment of the poor health
state clearly has become more cost-effective.
This example highlights that, although the correction for the
medium health state is larger in absolute terms (i.e., 0.035 vs.
0.02), it does not necessarily mean that the related CUR will have
the strongest improvement as well. Instead, the proportional CFs
then become important. As shown in the last column of Table 2,
these are higher for uncorrected TTO scores of 0.1 than for
uncorrected TTO scores of 0.5. Actually, they decrease mono-
tonically with uncorrected TTO scores. While it may be coun-
terintuitive that absolute differences are less important, this may
be easily explained with the above examples and a ﬁxed budget
of €50,000. With this budget, ten people can be treated with the
ﬁrst treatment (restoring health to 0.1) while two can be treated
with the second treatment restoring health to 0.5. Without cor-
rection for time preference, opting for either choice results in 1
QALY gained (10 times 0.1 or 2 times 0.5). After correction,
however, the choice is between gaining 1.2 QALYs or 1.07
QALYs (10 times 0.12 or 2 times 0.535).
Example 3—Monetary Impact
It may also be illustrative to demonstrate the monetary value of
correcting for time preference in the valuation of effects. Suppose
the threshold value for a gained QALY is set at €50,000. Then, if
a patient gets a treatment preventing her from death and bringing
her to a health state that was valued with a 10-year TTO at 0.4
for 1 year, this life extension may cost no more than
0.4375*€50,000 = €21,875 in order to be deemed cost-effective
when using corrected TTO scores, whereas it may have cost
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0.4*€50,000 = €20,000 when not correcting for time preference.
That is, there is an increase in produced value of €1875, meaning
that a treatment is allowed to cost €1875 more when compared
with a ﬁxed threshold of €50,000. It is easy to see that correction
for time preference therefore may have an impact on the ﬁnal
decision made when judging some intervention against a ﬁxed
threshold, and may prevent cost-effective programs to be wrong-
fully rejected as well as cost-ineffective programs to be wrong-
fully accepted.
Conclusions
This article has shown the inﬂuence and importance of correct-
ing TTO scores for time preference. Using empirically derived
time preference rates and simulations, it was demonstrated that
the value of correcting values can be substantial, also when
considering the use of health state valuations in practice. Our
results demonstrate that correcting for time preference does not
result in one clear inﬂuence on the QALY gains from health
improvements. While the QALY values of all health states
between death and full health will increase because of correc-
tion for time preference, it depends on the CF relevant for the
initial health state relative to that of the end state whether cor-
rection will result in a larger or smaller QALY gain when
moving from health state A to B. Moreover, when considering
these changes in the context of CURs, the proportional change
in the QALY gain is crucial. It is therefore important to keep in
mind the context when considering the policy implications of
correcting for time preference. That is, when only focusing on
the health improvement of several treatments that save lives,
correction for time preference is most favorable for treatments
that result in health states with the highest CFs. Life saving
programs that result in poor health states have lower absolute
CFs, but tend to be more favorable when considering CURs,
because their relative CFs are higher.
For treatments that have a positive net CF (i.e.,
CFB - CFA > 0), correcting for time preference reduces the CURs,
so that they may be deemed cost-effective sooner. In other words,
the value of treatments increases because the treatment produces
more QALYs than captured by the raw TTO score. However,
because the net CF can also be negative (i.e., CFB - CFA < 0),
correcting for time preference does not result in improved CURs
as a rule. For example, for treatments restoring full health from
some inferior health state, the net CF will always be negative and
therefore the CUR of such programs will worsen because of
correction. That is, the health improvement now has less value.
Similarly, when looking at differences between health states, the
CFs can also cancel each other out, resulting in the difference
between corrected scores being almost identical to the difference
in uncorrected scores.
So, what do these results imply? First of all, that it matters in
terms of QALY values, QALY gains and CURs whether one
corrects for time preference or not. Given the clear inﬂuence time
preference has on health state valuations in a TTO, and the
available methods to correct for time preference (e.g., [15]), there
seems little justiﬁcation for not correcting for time preference.
One may argue that other biases in TTO exercises have an
upward bias in the value, whereas time preference has a down-
ward bias [4], so that these biases may work in opposite direc-
tions and uncorrected scores may be preferable to corrected ones.
However, because there is no reason to assume that the biases
equal out, and indeed, given the diversity in inﬂuence of time
preference on the outcomes, it seems rather heroic to assume
such a balance in biases. It seems more appropriate to avoid or
correct biases than to assume that not correcting is better than
correcting for them.
Second, the observation of considerably lower CFs (see
Table 2) for shorter gauge durations might suggest an inclination
to favor the use of shorter gauge durations over larger ones in TTO
valuations. There exists an important caveat to this conclusion,
though. A number of empirical studies have found that short
gauge durations have some major difﬁculties in measuring health
state utilities. In particular, because of loss aversion, individuals
are not willing to sacriﬁce life duration to improve quality of life
for short remaining lifetimes, whereas lifetime and quality of life
are much better substitutes for longer gauge durations [17,18].
This ﬁnding makes clear the tradeoff between biases present for
short gauge durations (such as loss aversion) and biases present for
long gauge durations (such as time preference), and suggests that
employing longer gauge durations while correcting for time pref-
erence should certainly not be ruled out in advance.
Third, it seems feasible to derive sets of CFs that can be used to
correct existing TTO values (such as national tariffs), which
would facilitate correcting for time preference in practice. We
stress that the CFs we used may be seen as a ﬁrst indication of
reasonable CFs, but that they are not obtained in a representative
sample of the population and with one particular method of
deriving time preference and therefore should be used with
caution. A full set of CFs may also include CFs for health states
worse than dead, which are not included or discussed in this
article. The application of such factors will, however, be similar
for such states.
We do stress two limitations of using average CFs and, in
particular, the ones presented here:
1. Using aggregate “community-based” CFs to correct TTO
scores for time preference may overlook important indi-
vidual heterogeneity. Individuals’ TTO responses are
affected by their own time preferences, which normally vary
substantially between individuals, with some people even
expressing negative time preference [19]. Variability in TTO
scores could therefore be because of either variability in time
preference or variability in intrinsic health-state utility.
While on average, neglecting heterogeneity in time prefer-
ence may not lead to large systematic biases in the estimates
of the corrected utility, this is worthwhile investigating
further. In principle, given the common use of tariffs for
health states, it appears that using mean CFs to correct mean
utilities across a population, while losing some heterogeneity
at the individual level, may be acceptable as long as there are
no systematic differences across different subgroups.
2. The method used here to derive time preference may not be
without problems. For example, the direct method may be
susceptible to loss aversion, i.e., subjects may be overly
reluctant to a decreasing health status, which would under-
estimate time preference in this method. In addition, the
method elicits time weights under certainty, whereas many
health-related decisions involve uncertainty. However, we
used this method here to illustrate the more general point
made in this article. Other time preference elicitation
methods, such as the certainty equivalence method, could
have been used as well. The qualitative effect of using other
means to derive CFs will most likely be the same, although
the quantitative impact may differ to some extent. Cur-
rently, it seems unclear which method would be preferred
for this purpose. Alternative methods to the one used here
also suffer from difﬁculties (see, e.g., [20–23]). It seems
therefore that more research is required to determine how
to best correct TTO scores for time preference.
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Still, in spite of these limitations, we would conclude that cor-
recting TTO scores for time preference is feasible and inﬂuential,
so that there can be a substantial value of correcting values for
time preference.
Source of ﬁnancial support: This study was made possible through a grant
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